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NOTES AND COMMENTS
JURY TRIALS IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
The seventh amendment to the Constitution guarantees the
right to jury trial in "Suits at common law."' In interpreting the
effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) on the
jury trial guarantee, the Supreme Court has broadened considerably
the scope of the seventh amendment, indicating that the right to
jury trial should be preserved wherever possible.2 Unique problems
are presented, however, by the use of juries in complex cases. The
enormous difficulties generated for jurors, courts and litigants raises
an inquiry whether the jury is fulfilling the role it was intended to
'U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
The seventh amendment has no application to cases in equity or admiralty. See Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 706 (1950);
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 447 (1944); Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253,
262 (1856). See generally 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 38.11 [5 & 6], at 118-19, 123-26 (2d
ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MooRE]; see also Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433,
446 (1830). Professor Wolfram suggests that the proponents of the seventh amendment did
not propose extending the jury trial right to equitable causes because merger, at that time,
was too visionary. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REv. 639, 642 (1973). Since the seventh amendment applies only to the courts of
the United States, its scope and meaning are determined without reference to state law. See
Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228
U.S. 364, 376-77 (1913); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1891); Shapiro & Coquillette,
The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REv. 442,
448 (1971); Wolfram, supra, at 646 & n.21.
I See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); see notes 75-98 and
accompanying text infra. The importance of jury trial long has been emphasized by the
Supreme Court. In Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (per curiam), the Court noted that
"[tihe federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength." Id. at 222;
accord, Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396-407 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting);
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830). Moreover, attempts to curtail the right
to jury trial must be carefully scrutinized. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1935).
Some eminent authorities have suggested that civil jury trials be abolished altogether
by repealing the seventh amendment. See, e.g., Burger, New Constitution for United States?,
TRAL 5 (Aug.-Sept. 1970); Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay of Justice, in THE JuRY 20 (G.
Winters ed. 1971); see Wolfram, supra note 1, at 650-51 & n.40. See generally MooRE, supra
note 1, 38.02[1], at 8.1. It is interesting to note that the right to trial by jury in civil cases
has been eroded severely in England. See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 1, at 443 n.4;
Zander, The Jury in England: Decline and Fall?, in THE AMERICAN JuRY SYsTEM 29, 31 (1977).
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play in our system of justice. While "complex case" can have many
meanings, 3 as used in this Note it is typified by antitrust or securi-
ties litigation where there are many parties to the action and com-
plexity is inherent in the sheer volume of evidence to be heard and
digested by the jury, and often in the number of federal and state
laws and standards which must be applied to the evidence admitted
for and against each defendant.4 The issues in these cases may be
so complicated that the jury may lack the ability to comprehend,
remember or evaluate the evidence, although this has been a matter
of some debate.5 Responding to these problems, and notwithstand-
ing the Supreme Court's protective posture toward trial by jury,
several federal district courts recently have denied requests for jury
trials in complex cases.
It is suggested that any limitation on the use of juries should
be critically examined, especially in view of the procedural devices
available to assist the jurors.7 If, on balance, a jury trial appears to
be untenable, however, an alternate factfinder should be selected in
a manner which will preserve rather than erode the seventh amend-
ment. To this end, this Note will review the functions of the jury in
civil litigation and the problems of a trial-by-jury system in complex
litigation. It then will consider whether the jury's role is fulfilled in
a complex case. An evaluation of the procedural aids available to
ameliorate some of these problems will follow. In commenting on
various solutions, this Note will examine the scope of the right to
3 There is no prototype for complex litigation. It is not limited to cases with large
amounts of evidence and many litigants. Some cases involving fewer parties have been de-
scribed as being too complex for a jury because they dealt with intricate accounts, see Kirby
v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887); Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons
Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801, 804 (D. Kan. 1928), affl'd, 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931), or difficult
and technical subject matter, see ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423, 447 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Complicated lawsuits of this kind are typified by cases involving
patent validity or infringement, see, e.g., General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d
192, 197-98 (4th Cir. 1964), or cases where damages are exceedingly difficult to compute, see
Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 228 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
See, e.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 709 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
Despite the numerous problems, many authorities assert that juries are capable of
dealing with complex matters. See, e.g., Findings and Recommendations, in THE AmEEmcAN
JuRY SYsTEM 17, 19 (1977); Judges and the Jury, id. at 98 (remarks of Judge H. Small); see
Wolfram, supra note 1, at 731; Ziesel, The American Jury, in THE AimmcA-4 JURY SYsTEM 65,
69 (1977). See also In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash.
1976); Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
1 Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re U.S. Finan-
cial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420
F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976); notes 99-116 and accompanying text infra. See also ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 447 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
1 See notes 50-58 and accompanying text infra.
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jury trial as guaranteed by the seventh amendment and interpreted
by the Supreme Court and analyze the methods used by the federal
district courts to avoid jury trials in complex cases. With a view
toward preserving the integrity of the seventh amendment, the Note
will conclude by exploring the effectiveness of another alternative.
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY AND THE
PROBLEMS INHERENT IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
While there is little conclusive evidence of the objective of the
seventh amendment, it seems clear that the framers intended the
civil jury trial guarantee to perform several basic protective func-
tions in addition to serving as factfinder.8 The jury, being imrhune
from rationalization,' can serve to insure the integrity of the tri-
bunal hearing the case by shielding the litigant from corrupt, arbi-
trary or biased judges."0 Similarly, the jury can protect parties from
strong and powerful adversaries with political influence and expen-
sive legal advice.' The jury also serves a legislative function in that
it crystallizes and applies the community's perception of justice,
often before any standard has been embodied in a statute." In
bringing common sense to bear on the issues, the jury insulates
8 Wolfram, supra note 1, at 652 n.42; see Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the
Common Law: No Magic in Numbers, 56 F.R.D. 507, 513, 521 (1972). Professor Wolfram
states that, because of the paucity and questionable accuracy of historical materials, only an
imperfect understanding of the framers' original perceptions of the seventh amendment is
possible today. Wolfram, supra note 1, at 652. While all the reasons for adopting the seventh
amendment may not be discoverable, it is clear that the framers perceived the jury as serving
a protective function, see id. at 671-72, which was jealously guarded since early colonial days.
See J. HoUGHTEUNG, THE DYNAmcs OF LAw 51 (1968); Fisher, supra, at 511-12.
1 Clark, The American Jury: A Justification, in THE JURY 1, 4 (G. Winters ed. 1971).
10 MOORE, supra note 1, 38.02[1], at 17; RESEARCH AND INFORMATION SERVICE, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, FAcETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM: A SURVEY 39 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as FACETS OF THE JURY SYsTEM]; D. Ross, THE CnvL JURY SYSTEM - AN ESSENTIAL OF JUSTICE
- PRESERVE IT 16 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ross]; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 653; Ziesel,
supra note 5, at 67-68. See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (citing Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)). But see Landis, supra note 2, at 23. Alexander
Hamilton remarked that the use of the jury to protect litigants from corrupt judges was the
only persuasive argument in favor of civil jury trial. Tan FEDERALIST No. 83 (A. Hamilton),
at 563-64 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
MOORE, supra note 1, 38.02[1], at 17.
1 Id. See also J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 113-14, 120 (3d ed. 1973). Juries often render
"tempering moral judgments." Note, The Right to Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176, 1190
(1961). Perhaps the clearest illustration of the jury's legislative function has been its frequent
refusal to leave a partially negligent plaintiff remediless in a contributory negligence jurisdic-
tion. MooRE, supra note 1, 38.02[1], at 16; see J. HOUGHTELING, THE DYNAucS OF LAw 53
(1968); James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 716 (1938). See
generally James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949).
1979]
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litigants from oppressive or rigid rules of law by reaching a result
that a judge perhaps was unable or unwilling to reach.' 3 Finally,
since a jury verdict does not set any precedent, equitable decisions
are possible without the danger of creating bad law.'"
The jury's protective function, however, is related only margin-
ally to its capacity to understand and integrate the evidence in a
complex case.15 It must determine whether there is liability, to
whom and for how much based on all the evidence. It is with this
focus that two complex cases are discussed to illustrate the enormity
of that task.
Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc.'" was a complex antitrust
class action involving sixty-five named plaintiffs who were seeking
declaratory judgments, injunctions and damages against eleven de-
fendants. Since it was a treble damage suit under the antitrust laws,
the plaintiffs' right to jury trial was well settled.' 7 The court ob-
served that, since each class member was required to prove his own
injuries and damages with respect to each contract entered into with
each defendant, resolution of the case as to the named plaintiffs
would require in excess of 1000 "mini-trials."'" Moreover, the com-
plaint alleged seven separate conspiracies in violation of the anti-
trust laws.'9 The court projected a minimum of four months to try
the case notwithstanding its view that such an estimate probably
,1 Wolfram, supra note 1, at 671; see J. HOUGHTMEG, THE DYNAMICS OF LAW 53 (1968);
Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, in THE JURY 30,
34 (G. Winters ed. 1971). See also Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM.
JuD. Soc'Y 166, 170 (1929); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv.
L. Rav. 1281, 1286 (1952). This function of the jury has been criticized on the ground that
the jury does not consider the potential effects its decision will have on the law, see J. FRANK,
COUMRs ON TRIAL 120 (3d ed. 1973), and often bases its verdict on "fiction and not fact,"
MOORE, supra note 1, 38.02[1], at 14.
" I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 348-50 (6th ed. 1938).
,5 A jury, for example, may know that one litigant is powerful and well connected while
another is vulnerable and unknown, or it may sense that a tribunal is hostile to or prejudiced
against one of the parties quite apart from the evidence. Obviously, if a jury is predisposed
to protect a litigant because he is weak or the victim of a corrupt court, it will do so regardless
of the relative merits of the case. Similarly, with the legislative function, the jury need only
decide that someone has been injured and should be compensated. It will reach its desired
result notwithstanding the facts and the law.
,6 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
,7 See note 74 and accompanying text infra.
, 79 F.R.D. at 62. The court noted, however, that the figure of 1000 "mini-trials" did
not include any of the contracts made by the 400-900 absent class members. Id.
," Id. at 61-62, 66. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had conspired to deprive
them as a class of the copyrights to music and lyrics they had written. Id. at 61. While the
size of the class was disputed, the absent class members numbered anywhere from 400 to 900.
Id. at 62.
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was unrealistically short.2 0
While the burden confronting the factfinder in Bernstein was
enormous, it was overwhelming in In re U.S. Financial Securities
Litigation (USF),21 wherein eighteen cases were consolidated for
trial.2 2 Approximately twenty individual and eighty corporate or
partnership defendants, many of whom had filed cross claims, were
alleged to have violated federal and state securities laws.2 Some
complaints also alleged common law negligence, gross negligence,
fraud and malpractice.? The court speculated that 100,000 pages of
documentary evidence along would be presented to the fact finder,
a stack of paper as high as a three-story building.? This material
not only would have to be read and understood, but the jury also
would have to hear and remember many months of tedious, techni-
cal testimony about complex accounting methods and theories.6
The jury then would have to apply the evidence under the correct
law or standard to each cause asserted against each defendant.?
Finally, it would have to determine the extent of liability, if any, of
each defendant to each plaintiff, as well as the liability of the defen-
dants to each other, and the amount of damages.? The estimated
length of trial was two years.29
In cases like Bernstein and USF, it is clear that compulsory jury
duty would be a great hardship for most prospective jurors. Not only
21 Id. at 63-64. The court noted, however, that such an assumption was impractical
because civil trials often were interrupted to hear criminal matters. Id.
21 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
12 Id. at 705. Financial (USF) was a large corporation engaged in a nationwide real estate
development business. Its projects ranged from financing and issuing title insurance to de-
signing, manufacturing and construction. Id. The venture was not successful, however, and
trading in its securities was suspended. Thereafter, the corporation filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy. Id. In addition to the 17 lawsuits arising out of the failure of the business, the court
also was faced with a complaint filed by the SEC. Id. Five separate classes had been certified
at the time of the opinion. Id. at 705-06.
" Id. at 706. The complaints charged various inaccuracies in USF's financial statements,
by grossly inflating income and using improper methods of accounting. Id.
24 Id.
2 Id. at 707. The court observed that this would be the equivalent of reading the first 90
volumes of the Federal Reporter, Second Series, including the headnotes. Id. Depositions
alone filled 150,000 pages. The court noted that the actual testimony of the witnesses would
be more time-consuming than reading the depositions into the record. Id. The plaintiffs
asserted that they would offer approximately 12,000 documents into evidence, many of which
were multi-paged. The court assumed that the defendants would submit a comparable
amount of material. Id.
26 Id.
2 Id.
"Id.
28 Id. at 713.
19791
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may many jurors be unwilling to serve because jury duty often
proves to be tiresome and unrewarding, 0 but extremely long trials
may place unreasonable demands on a juror's time and interfere
with career or other commitments.3 ' Even in cases of shorter dura-
tion, a growing reluctance to serve has developed, especially among
businessmen.2 Moreover, most jurors would not receive an amount
equal to the income from their salaries. 3
Jury trials of complex cases also place burdens on the judicial
system. Many contend that, since jury trials are time consuming
and often difficult to manage, they contribute to the slow pace of
justice. 34 The wisdom of the Supreme Court's adoption of an expan-
sive view of the seventh amendment has been questioned at a time
when backlogs, delay and congestion have led to a re-evaluation of
the civil jury as "an instrument of justice. ' 35 Others have decried
the costs involved in jury trials,36 although. there is convincing evi-
See FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 1.
3' See In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 713-14 (S.D. Cal. 1977). See
also Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199,
208 (1976). Jury duty in most courts averages about 10 days. There is considerable variation,
however, and some courts require jury duty of 30 days or more, whereas others have a one
day or one trial method. FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 32-33. There is general
agreement that a shorter term is better because it relieves the burden on the juror. See id;
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, MANAGE-
MENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 25 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEMI.
32 See Rowe, The Plight of the Juror, in THE JURY 107 (G. Winters ed. 1971).
13 See FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 1; Chief Justice Burger Suggests
Waiving Juries in Complex Civil Trials, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13, 1979, at 21, col. 1 [hereinafter
cited as Chief Justice Burger]. See Jury System Improvements Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
572, 92 Stat. 2453 (amending Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § § 1861-1869
(1976)). The federal government provides an attendance fee of $30 per day. 28 U.S.C. § 1871
(b)(1) (1976). Section 1871(b)(2) gives the trial judge discretion to increase the compensation
by $5 per day for each day that a petit juror serves in excess of 30 days on the same case. Id.
§ 1871(b)(2). See FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 36-37. See generally Pabst &
Munsterman, Economic Hardship of Jury Duty, 58 JUDICATURE 494 (1975).
31 See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
J. HOUGHTELING, THE DYNAMCS OF LAw 54 (1968); FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 10,
at 1; Landis, supra note 2, at 21-22; Morris, Jury Trial Under the Federal Fusion Of Law And
Equity, 20 TEx. L. REv. 427, 429 (1942); Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the
Seventh Amendment, 81 Yale L.J. 112, 124-26 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Uncertain
Future]. See generally H. JAMES, CRISIS IN Tm COURTS (1967). But see Clark, supra note 9,
at 5. Various studies have been undertaken to compare the duration of court and jury trials.
One study found that jury trials take 67% more time. Uncertain Future, supra, at 124-25 &
n.72 (citing H. ZEiSEL, H. KALvEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN TM COURTS 74, 79 (1959)).
But cf. Clark, supra note 9, at 5 (slight time difference between jury and court trials, with
jury trials often less time-consuming). See also Clark, supra, at 5-6 (2/3 of jury cases are
settled before verdict compared with 40% of nonjury cases).
5 See MooRE, supra note 1, 38.11[9], at 128.23. See generally notes 75-95 and accom-
panying text infra.
31 ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
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dence that the economic arguments have little basis in fact."7 Com-
plex litigation presents additional considerations for the courts.
Besides finding jurors who are willing and able to serve, there is no
guarantee that a full panel of jurors will remain until the end of the
trial. 3 The most significant problem is that a jury may not be able
to reach a reasoned decision, or any decision at all, due to its fre-
quent inability to understand the evidence in a complex case.3'
Under some circumstances a mistrial will have to be declared or a
new trial ordered, thereby increasing both the time and money
spent in the litigation and further congesting the court calendar.40
Jury trial of complex cases also raises questions to fairness to
the litigants." The first is whether a representative jury, which pre-
see FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 1; Landis, supra note 2, at 21-22; Morris,
supra note 34, at 429. But see Clark, supra note 9, at 6. But cf. Findings and
Recommendations, in THE ArmucAN JURY SYSTEM 17, 19 (1977) (cost savings would not justify
changes in American jury system). See generally H. JAMES, CRSis IN THE Courrs (1967). As a
result of efforts to deal with the backlogs and costs involved in litigation, variations in the
traditional concept of the civil jury have evolved. For example, less than 12-member juries
may be used in state proceedings, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86-103 (1970), or federal
courts, CoIgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 151-64 (1973). Many federal courts have imple-
mented the use of a six-member jury, and the response has been favorable. See Thompson,
What Is the Magic of '12'?, 5 JUDGES J. 88 (1971) (remarks of Justice Edmund Thompson);
The Six Man Jury in the Federal Court, 53 F.R.D. 273 (1971) (remarks of Chief Judge Edward
J. Devitt, U.S. District Court, Minnesota); Beiser & Varrin, Six-Member Juries in the Federal
Courts, 58 JuDCATUE 424 (1975). Six-member juries, of course, will not ameliorate signifi-
cantly the problems posed by a complex case. See notes 16-46 and accompanying text supra.
The Supreme Court's approval of less-than-unanimous verdicts, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404, 410-12 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359-63 (1972), appears to reflect
an effort to deal with time and cost problems.
11 See Padawer-Singer, Justice or Judgments?, in THE AMEmcAN JURY SYSTEM 45, 46-50
(1977). Of the nearly 330 million dollars expended to meet the costs of operating the federal
judicial system, only 4.7% or approximately 15.6 million dollars was spent for fees, subsist-
ence and mileage to petit jurors. Id. at 46-47.
"In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 714 (S.D. Cal. 1977). The court
pointed out that during a two year trial, elderly jurors might die and housewives may have
to move with their husbands out of the jurisdiction. Id. The USF court noted that in proceed-
ings that were going on at the same time in the state courts, see id. at 708, four alternate
jurors had been selected and after three months of trial, two of the jurors already had been
excused. Id. Bifurcated proceedings create additional problems. If the alternates are excused
at the conclusion of the liability trial, there are no alternates remaining for the damages trial.
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 443 & n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, Nos. 78-7445, 78-7448 (2d Cir. June 25, 1979).
,See Chief Justice Burger, supra note 33; notes 16-29 and accompanying text supra.
"See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 444, 447 (N.D. Cal.
1978). But see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, Nos. 78-7445, 78-7448 (2d Cir. June 25,
1979).
" While the length of a complex trial is an exacerbating factor, at least one court has
held that a lengthy proceeding is not a per se denial of a fair trial. United States v. Dardi,
19791
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supposes impartial persons of diverse backgrounds, can be empa-
neled1 1 The large number of exemptions and excuses that would
have to be granted in a complicated lawsuit make it highly unlikely
that the resulting pool would constitute a cross section of the com-
munity. 3 As one court suggested, the litigants would be left with
housewives whose children had grown, welfare recipients, retired
persons or wealthy individuals who do not have to work." Thus, the
class of persons most likely to understand the issues in a complex
case, businessmen or attorneys, are the very persons who would be
excused or exempt.45 In addition, litigants may be deprived of an
adequate remedy at law if the jury cannot fulfill its factfinding
function."6
330 F.2d 316, 329-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964) (citing People v. Clemente, 8
N.Y.2d 1, 7, 167 N.E.2d 327, 328, 200 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626, cert. denied sub nom. Brinkman v.
New York, 364 U.S. 923 (1960)). But see Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 125-26. See also
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Conn. 1977). This decision appears sound
and is supported by collateral evidence that juries may act arbitrarily even in trials that are
not lengthy and complex. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 114-15 (3d ed. 1973). Judge Frank
states that juries consistently have reached their verdicts by one of three methods: (1) each
juror writes down an amount he or she wants to award and the amounts are averaged; (2)
the jurors agree to decide for one party or another by the flip of a coin; (3) in cases of deadlock,
24 ballots are prepared, twelve of which represent each view. The vote of each juror is then
determined by picking a ballot out of a hat. See J. HOUG'rrELING, THE DYNAMICS OF LAw 52
(1968). See generally Strodtbeck, Social Process, the Law, and Jury Functioning, in LAw AND
SOCIOLOGY: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 144-64 (W. Evan ed. 1962).
42 See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise
Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash. 1976). See generally FACETS OF
THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 18-22. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (1976).
11 See MANAGEMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 31, at 12. Federal courts allow
exemptions from jury duty for servicemen on active duty, police or firemen of any state or
governmental subdivision, and actively engaged legislative, executive or judicial officers of
the United States, state or any political subdivision. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6) (1976). Additional
classes of exemptions are permissible, provided the district court finds that they are in the
public interest and do not violate the policy of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1862 (1976). Moreover, certain persons may be excused upon request if the
district court finds "undue hardship or extreme inconvenience." 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(5)
(1976); see J. HOUGHTELInG, THE DYNAMICS OF LAw 54-55 (1968); MANAGEMENT OF THE JURY
SYSTEM, supra note 31, at 4. See also United States v. Lindelow, 435 F. Supp. 367 (D.P.R.
1977). Moreover, many citizens know how to take advantage of the exemptions and excuses
to evade jury duty. See Landis, supra note 2, at 23-24.
" Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see In re Boise
Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
11 See Chief Justice Burger, supra note 33; note 43 supra. Businessmen are often excused
because extremely long trials may place unreasonable demands on their time. See Kirkham,
supra note 31, at 208; Rowe, supra note 32, at 108.
11 See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re U.S.
Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 707-08 (S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 103 (W.D. Wash. 1976); notes 16-29 and accompanying text
supra. But see note 5 supra.
JURY TRIAL
Despite the numerous problems presented by the use of juries
in complex cases, their protective intervention may be just as neces-
sary." For this reason, several alternatives and procedural devices
will be explored with a view toward preserving jury trial in complex
cases where possible.
In an effort to reach a compromise between the seventh amend-
ment and the problems inherent in complex litigation, one court has
proposed that the right to a jury be limited to one trial for each
complex case.48 Accordingly, a jury demand would have to be
granted regardless of the complexity of a case, although the court
could direct a verdict or order a new trial should the jury be unable
to reach a verdict." While this alternative is an effort to preserve
jury trial, it does not alleviate the time and cost burdens on jurors,
the problem of empaneling and keeping a representative jury or the
inability of the jury properly to fulfill its factfinding function. More-
over, such an alternative seems inefficient, time consuming and
expensive.
A second alternative would be to increase the use of the special
verdict. Pursuant to the Federal Rules, the court may require the
jury to make written findings on questions of fact that have been
framed by the court 0 The court then would apply the law to these
findings. The implementation of the special verdict would insulate
litigants from general verdicts based on clearly erroneous findings
of fact and misapplication of the law and make jury trial more
efficient.5 Its use, however, is limited where the evidence is so com-
plicated that the jury is unable to answer the questions posed by the
court. Special verdicts also would not substantially reduce the cost
burdens associated with complex litigation.
11 See Tamm, supra note 13, at 35 & n.30; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 731; Zeisel, supra
note 5, at 68; notes 8-14 and accompanying text supra. One of the purposes behind the
seventh amendment is the capacity to achieve a result that a judge would not have achieved.
See Wolfram, supra note 1, at 671, 746. For a discussion of the "functional desirability" of a
civil jury, see Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 922 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 1972); J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRAL 108-45 (1949); J. FRAN, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 170-85, 302-09
(1935); Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. Rav. 1055 (1964).
"s See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal.
1978).
11 Id. The ILC case was an antitrust action, involving many complicated and technical
concepts. Id. After the jury found for the plaintiff, the court declared a mistrial, concluding
that the evidence could not justify a verdict for the plaintiff, and directed a verdict for the
defendant. Id. at 444.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
' See C. JoINER, CIviL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 84-85 (1962); Simmonds, Reform in the Jury
System, 21 TENN. L. REV. 389, 393 (1950); Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE
L.J. 253, 258-62 (1920).
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A final method of avoiding the abolition of jury trials in com-
plex suits is through the use of Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules,
which permits the court to refer complicated issues to a master in
order to assist the jury in its role as factfinder 2 Since the master
often will be able to organize and present the evidence in a manner
that is capable of being understood by individual jurors, Rule 53(b)
could provide an adequate answer to jury incompetence in some
complex cases. 3 The use of masters would not threaten the seventh
amendment jury trial guarantee since the jury is not superseded as
factfinder. 4 Rather, the master's findings are admissible as expert
testimony which the jury is free to accept, reject or give whatever
weight it wishes." Moreover, since Rule 53(b) allows reference only
in exceptional cases,58 and because jury demands cannot be struck
unless a master is rejected,57 it is unlikely that the seventh amend-
ment right to a jury trial will be diluted under this alternative.
Sometimes, however, cases may be so complicated that the jury
would not even be capable of comprehending the master's testi-
mony.5" Thus, Rule 53(b), like the special verdict, has limited use-
fulness when factfinding is extremely complicated. While the use of
the master ameliorates one of the major problems inherent in com-
plex litigation, therefore, it does not significantly affect any of the
52 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) provides in pertinent part: "A reference to a master shall be the
exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only
when the issues are complicated .... "
3 See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1962); Hart v. Community
School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 764-67 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.
1974); 5A MooRE, supra note 1, 53.05[2], at 2958 n.41; The Prettyman Comm. Report on
Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62, 79-81 (1951). A master
can assist the jury in complex accountings and some matters pertaining to the merits. See
5A MooRE, supra note 1, 1 53.05[2], at 2957-62. But cf. Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D.
218, 226 n.13 (D.R.I. 1978) (constitutional validity of reference to masters may be limited to
reference of complex accounting issues in jury trials).
3 In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
11 5A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrmcE 53.14[2], at 3036.
11 See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 & n.18, 479 (1962) (quoting La Buy
v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 258 (1957)); note 52 supra.
, See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1962); Bernstein v. Universal
Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp.
914, 922-23 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
11 See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re
United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 713 (S.D. Cal. 1977); notes 16-29 and
accompanying text supra. In Bernstein, the court noted that the liability issues, which re-
quired testimony concerning each contract between the parties and the negotiations leading
up to each, were not appropriate for submission to a master. 79 F.R.D. at 71. Similarly, the
USF court reasoned that the mere presentation of figures by a master would not enable the
jury to understand and integrate the master's findings. 75 F.R.D. at 713.
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other problems experienced by jurors, courts and litigants.
It is submitted that, notwithstanding the various alternatives
which have been proposed, and despite the loss of the jury's protec-
tive functions, the jury should not serve as factfinder in a complex
antitrust or securities case. There are simply too many significant
issues which militate against its use. Although economic considera-
tions alone do not justify abandonment of jury trial in such cases,59
other factors point to that end. Empaneling and keeping a repre-
sentative jury may be virtually impossible where jurors must serve
for two years. Moreover, even if they do serve for two years, they
may not understand or remember the issues or the evidence even
with the aid of a master. Not only does the volume of evidence which
the jury must remember stagger the imagination, but the jury is
untrained in the controlling concepts and laws and technical termi-
nology, and it cannot immediately appreciate either the significance
of the evidence presented or the weight it should be accorded. It may
be unable to sift out important pieces of evidence before that evi-
dence fades into the recesses of memory. Moreover, these limita-
tions are exacerbated by inconveniences which jurors face. Although
jury trial is inappropriate in a complex case, it is an institution of
great value and the seventh amendment should be protected from
erosion as much as possible. Consequently, the rationales for reach-
ing the desired end, an alternate factfinder, should be examined
with a view toward their impact on the seventh amendment gener-
ally.
THE CONsTUTIONAL RIGHT To JURY TRIAL: THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT
The Historical Approach
The mandate of the seventh amendment that jury trials be
preserved in "Suits at common law" was defined early in American
jurisprudence with reference to the common law of England in 1791,
the year the seventh amendment was adopted." It then was the
11 See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 216 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). In
Green, Justice Black stated that "trifling economies . . . have not generally been thought
sufficient reason for abandoning our great constitutional safeguards aimed at protecting
freedom and other basic human rights of incalculable value." Id.
C1 United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812). The seventh
amendment was intended to preserve the substance, and not the form, of jury trial as it
existed in 1791. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390-92 (1943); Gasoline Prods. Co.
v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931); In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920);
American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 467 (1897); Walker v. New Mexico & S.
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English practice to administer law and equity by separate courts,
each having distinct jurisdictions." Actions at law were tried to
juries, and cases brought in equity were heard by the chancellor.62
When legal remedies did not exist or were inadequate, equity juris-
diction attached although the suit also may have presented claims
cognizable at common law.63 Once the cause was within equity's
concurrent jurisdiction, the chancellor had an option: he could re-
quire that the legal claims be adjudicated first, necessitating a jury
trial, or he could resolve the entire case in equity,6 thereby preclud-
ing the action at law due to the principles of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel. 5 By opting for the latter, the chancellor effectively
could thwart the right to jury trial for the common law claims.
Where causes of action were created after 1791, and Congress
had not specified the mode of trial, American courts initially used
an historical approach, fitting the cause sued upon into its closest
historical analogue.6 If the corresponding historical action was rec-
ognized at common law, the new cause of action came within the
protection of the seventh amendment's jury trial guarantee.17 The
Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897); Wolfram, supra note 1, at 735. The static reference to
the English common law of 1791 generally has been accepted. See Baltimore & Carolina Line,
Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); F.
JAMFS, Cv PROCEDURE 337 (1965); MOORE, supra note 1, 38.08[5], at 79-80 n.53; Shapiro
& Coquillette, supra note 1, at 448.
, 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLiSH LAW 446 (6th ed. 1938).
62 See F. JAMEs, CIVI. PROCEDURE 337 (1965).
' Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 120 & n.47 (1971).
64 The power of the chancellor to hear the entire case in equity was based on "clean-up"
jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, the chancellor could determine legal questions and provide
legal relief which normally would not have been within his jurisdiction. See Fitzpatrick v.
Sun Life Assurance Co., 1 F.R.D. 713, 716-17 (D.N.J. 1941). In recent years, the Supreme
Court has considered equity's "clean-up" jurisdiction in light of the seventh amendment and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and presently, it is doubtful whether anything remains
of it. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506 (1959); notes 75-95 and accompanying text infra. But see Katchen
v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 335-36 (1966) (quoting Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 241-42
(1935)); Gefen v. United States, 400 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1119
(1969). See generally Chesnin & Hazard, Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment:
Jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791, 83 YALE L.J. 999 (1974).
65 Since the chancellor's findings of fact in equity were binding in the suit at law on
common issues of fact, Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 159 (1899); Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y.
156, 165-66 (1854), the parties were collaterally estopped from relitigating those issues before
a jury. 2B W. BARRON & A. HourzOw, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 894, at 82 (1961).
11 See Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1933); James, Right to a Jury Trial in
Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963); Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 113.
11 Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 376-80 (1913); Capital Traction Co.
v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899); United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812);
Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 916 (S.D. Tex. 1972); see Moore, supra note 1,
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historical test was not always easy to apply, however, since difficul-
ties often arose in determining the legal or equitable nature of the
historical analogue."
The Effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
When the Federal Rules merged courts of law and equity and
created a consolidated civil jurisdiction," the substantive right to
jury trial at common law was not intended to be abridged, enlarged
or modified, but rather preserved as mandated by the seventh
amendment and federal statutes. 0 Consequently, cases triable by
jury prior to the passage of the Federal Rules remained jury actions,
and causes previously heard in equity continued to be adjudicated
by the courts. 71 In actions involving legal and equitable issues hav-
ing questions of fact common to both, the order of the trial of these
issues became significant since adjudication of the equitable issues
first would collaterally estop the parties from litigating these issues
before a jury.72 Until 1959, the order of trial was determined by the
38.11[6], at 121; Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 113. For a criticism of the historical
test, see Wolfram, supra note 1, at 731.
" Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891); see Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Wes-
tover, 359 U.S. 500, 516 (1959).
1' FED. R. Civ. P. 2; see 2 MooR, supra note 1, 2.02[1], at 303-04 (2d ed. 1979).
70 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Candimat Co., 83 F.
Supp. 1, 2 (D. Md. 1949); Olearchick v. American Steel Foundaries, 73 F. Supp. 273, 279
(W.D. Pa. 1947); Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 343, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1947);
Arnstein v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 3 F.R.D. 58,59 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); FED. R. CIV.
P. 38(a), 39; MooR, supra note 1, 38.02[2], at 21. See also United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 340 U.S. 543, 555-56 (1951).
11 MooRE, supra note 1, 38.11[6], at 121-22. An affirmative demand for a trial by jury
is required by Rule 38. FED. R. Cirv. P. 38. If the demand is not timely, the right to a jury is
waived. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d). The action would then be tried before the court, see MooRE,
supra note 1, 38.08[6], at 92, unless, in its discretion, a jury trial was ordered. FED. R. Civ.
P. 39(b). See also General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 952 (1964). The plaintiff in Watkins argued that the district court had abused its
discretion under Rule 39(b) by refusing to order a jury trial after a waiver under 38(d). The
court reasoned, however, that the complexity of the case and difficulty of the subject matter
warranted a trial by the court rather than an inexperienced jury. In addition, a nonjury trial
would result in a substantial saving of time. 331 F.2d at 197.
72 See note 65 and accompanying text supra. There is no waiver of the right to jury trial
by the joinder of legal and equitable claims or remedies under FED. R. Civ. P. 18. See Ring
v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948). This is true even when
the claims are separate and distinct. See McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons, Inc., 177 F.2d
137, 139 (2d Cir. 1949); Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1946); Hartford-
Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 3 F.R.D. 50, 51 (W.D. Pa. 1943). Likewise, the right is
not waived by imposition of a legal counterclaim under Rule 13, whether compulsory or
permissive, in an equitable action. See FaD. R. Civ. P. 13; MooR, supra note 1, 38.13, at
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:751
basic nature of the dispute.7 3 For example, where an action seeking
treble damages for violations of the antitrust laws was accompanied
by a prayer for injunctive relief, the legal issues were tried first
because the general character of the lawsuit was deemed legal. 74
Beginning in 1959, the Supreme Court decided several cases which
dealt with the effect of the Federal Rules on the scope of equity
jurisdiction.
In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,75 the Supreme Court re-
jected the notion that trial courts had free discretion to determine
the sequence of trial in an antitrust action in which legal and equita-
ble issues were involved." Rather, it was found that the seventh
'3 See Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948);
Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943);
Hargrove v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225, 228 (10th Cir. 1942); MooRE, supra note
1, 38.16[1], at 153-162.2.
14 Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948); Forstmann
Woolen Co. v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). In large part,
this conclusion was based upon dicta in a 1916 case emphasizing the right to jury trial in a
treble damage suit. See Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916). In
Fleitmann, a shareholder brought a derivative action, traditionally deemed equitable in
nature, for treble damages under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 240 U.S. at 28. In
addressing the question whether a jury trial was appropriate, the Court reasoned that, "when
a penalty of triple damages is sought to be inflicted, the statute should not be read as
attempting to authorize liability to be enforced otherwise than through the verdict of a jury
in a court of common law." Id. at 29. The Court was apparently influenced by the punitive
nature of the imposition of treble damages. Since only a court of law could award punitive
damages, see MooRE, supra note 1, 38,37[2], at 308.2, the Court concluded that an anti-
trust action seeking treble damages could not be tried by a court of equity. 240 U.S. at 29.
See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917) (stockholder
may not sue at law to recover treble damages on behalf of corporation for violations of
Sherman Act since derivative actions may be brought only in a court of equity); Fanchon &
Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953). But see Davis v.
Marathon Oil Co., 57 F.R.D. 23, 24 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 395
(6th Cir. 1975). See generally Comment, Federal Antitrust Law-Stockholders' Remedies For
Corporate Injury Resulting From Antitrust Violations: Derivative Antitrust Suit and Fidu-
ciary Duty Action, 59 MicH. L. REv. 904 (1961). The conclusion that there is a right to jury
trial in treble damage suits has been criticized. See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79
F.R.D. 59, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 57 F.R.D. 23, 24 (N.D. Ohio 1972),
aff'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Finlay & Assoc. v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 210, 214 n.1, 369 A.2d 541, 543 n.1 (1976), aff'd, 155 N.J. Super. 331,
382 A.2d 933 (1978). One court has suggested that it is "probably not required by history,
logic or statute." Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 66. Many lower courts,
however, have accepted the principle. See, e.g., Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 57 F.R.D. 23, 24
(N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1975); Lah v. Shell Oil Co.,
50 F.R.D. 198, 199 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
75 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
76 Id. at 508-11. In Beacon Theatres, a potential defendant in an antitrust action sought
a declaratory judgment that it was not violating the antitrust laws and requested that the
bringing of an antitrust claim against it be enjoined pending the declaratory judgment suit.
Id. at 502-03. The defendant filed a counterclaim under the antitrust laws for treble damages
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amendment mandates that a trial judge must use his discretion to
preserve jury trials wherever possible by ordering the adjudication
of the legal claims first.7" Noting that equity jurisdiction always had
attached when the remedies at law were inadequate," the Court
reasoned that the adequacy of a remedy now must be determined
with reference to the Federal Rules and the Declaratory Judgment
Act.7" Additionally, since the Federal Rules allow courts to grant
legal and equitable remedies," the historical restraint requiring the
trial of legal issues in equity was removed, thus permitting the legal
issues to be tried by a jury.8 ' Only in exceptional circumstances,
therefore, could the right to a jury trial be lost through prior adjudi-
cation of equitable claims. 2 The right to jury trial was further ex-
panded in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 1 wherein the Supreme Court
and demanded a jury trial on the common issues of fact. Id. The district court characterized
the issues in the declaratory judgement action as basically equitable in nature and ordered
that those issues be tried first pursuant to its discretion under Rules 42(b) and 57. Id. at 503;
see FED. R. CIv. P. 42(b), 57. Consequently, i key factual issue in the counterclaim for treble
damages would be determined by the court, foreclosing relitigation through the operation of
res judicata or collateral estoppel. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864, 874 (9th
Cir. 1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); see Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971), discussed in Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 1, at 448; notes
63-65 and accompanying text supra.
" 359 U.S. at 510; accord, Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d
486, 490-91 (5th Cir. 1961); see MOORE, supra note 1, 38.11[8. -2], at 128.9. This is true
even where the action is primarily equitable in nature. Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F.
Supp. 914, 921 (S.D. Tex. 1972). See also Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971); Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 1, at 457.
The well-settled principle that a district court could control its own docket and order the
equitable cause tried first even where there was a common issue of fact, see American Life
Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937), apparently was eradicated by Beacon Theatres,
359 U.S. at 517-18 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
78 See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
, 359 U.S. at 509; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 2; MOORE, supra note
1, T 38.07[1], at 44.5, 38.04[2], at 34; notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra. But see
359 U.S. at 517-19 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing American Life Ins. Co. v. Reese, 300 U.S.
203, 215 (1937)), pointing out that equity jurisdiction traditionally was not vitiated because
a legal remedy became available. Justice Stewart opined that the Federal Rules did not
expand the right to jury trial and was not intended to undermine the structure of equity.
Accord, MOORE, supra note 1, 38.11[9], at 128.23 & n.19.
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 2; see notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
8, 359 U.S. at 510; see Uncertain Future, supra note 34 at 120.
82 359 U.S. at 510-11; see MOORE, supra note 1, 38.11[8.-2], at 128.7. Prior to striking
a jury demand, the court must seek any available means, including the Rules, to permit trial
by jury. See Wolfram, supra note 1, at 644. Furthermore, regardless of the form in which the
cause of action is presented, there is a right to trial by jury for any claim that traditionally
would have been triable by law. See Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249, 1252 (3d Cir. 1969).
Under limited circumstances, however, the court might order the equitable claim tried first
despite the effect of res judicata. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966).
- 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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concluded that any legal issue must be tried by a jury on a proper
and timely demand whether it is joined with a claim for equitable
relief or is characterized as "incidental" to the equitable issues in
the case.84 Relying on Beacon, the Court determined that a suit for
an "equitable accounting" was nothing more than a common law
damage action for which a court of law could provide an adequate
remedy by utilizing the procedural devices and remedies furnished
by the Federal Rules and the Declaratory Judgment Act.,,
The Court continued to demonstrate its partiality for civil jury
trials in Ross v. Bernhard,88 where it held that the seventh amend-
ment right to trial by jury extends to the legal issues involved in a
stockholder derivative suit, 7 an action historically heard only in a
court of equity." Basing its rationale on the merger of law and
equity,8 the Court found that the seventh amendment jury trial
guarantee was not vitiated simply because equity first had to adju-
dicate the issue of standing to sue derivatively.8 0 In effect, the Court
11 Id. at 471-72 (relying on Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-110, 117 (1891)); see Cates
v. Allen, 149 U.S. 451 (1893). The plaintiff in Dairy Queen sued for an injunction and an
accounting, and the defendant made a timely demand for a jury. The district court denied
the demand since the action was "purely equitable" or, if not, that the legal issues were
merely incidental to the equitable claims. 369 U.S. at 473-76.
83 369 U.S. at 477-79. The Court held that the right to jury trial could not depend upon
the plaintiff's choice of words in the pleadings. The Court reasoned that, to maintain a suit
for an "equitable accounting" triable by the court, the litigant would have to show that the
accounts were so involved that only a court of equity could untangle them. Since the Rules
permit the courts to appoint masters to help juries sort out such complicated evidence,
however, see FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (b), claims for an accounting will rarely be classified as
equitable in nature. 369 U.S. at 477-79; see FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b); notes 52-58 and accompany-
ing text supra.
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
'5 Id. at 537-38. Had the corporation sued on its own behalf, it clearly would have been
entitled to a jury trial. Id. at 542.
Is Id. at 544 & n.4, 546 (Stewart, J., dissenting). While there was no shareholder deriva-
tive action in England in 1791, see Uncertain Future, supra, note 34 at 115 & n.26, the
derivative action was heard in equity because the shareholder was threatened with irreparable
harm and had no remedy at law when the corporation itself refused to sue. 396 U.S. at 539.
'5 396 U.S. at 539-40; FED. R. Civ. P. 2; see notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
,0 396 U.S. at 539-40. The Court concluded that the shareholder's claims were essentially
those of the corporation and that the only reason for requiring the derivative suit to be
brought in equity was because courts of law historically had refused to recognize a share.
holder's standing to sue on behalf of his corporation. Id. With the advent of the Rules, the
procedural barrier of standing, which impeded the shareholder's right to sue derivatively in
a court of law, was abolished. Id.; see MOORE, supra note 1, $ 38.11[8.-8], at 128.18. But
see Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 121. The Court held, therefore, that the seventh
amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial of the issues in a derivative suit that would
have been triable by a jury had the corporation brought the action. 396 U.S. at 532-33.
This result has been harshly criticized. See id. at 544-45 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 118, 122. The thrust of Justice Stewart's argument was
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extracted the legal issues from a traditionally equitable action and
held that the legal claims set forth in the complaint were protected
by the seventh amendment even though the legal issues could not
have been tried at law prior to the passage of the joinder provisions
in the Federal Rules. 9'
In deciding the case, the Ross Court set forth a test to aid in
determining whether the issues in a case are legal: a court must
consider "first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such ques-
tions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities
and limitations of juries."9 The first criterion appears to be nothing
more than a reaffirmation of the historical analogue method, while
the second factor could be regarded as combining the historical
approach with the effect of the Federal Rules on the remedies at
that Congress clearly did not intend the Rules to expand the right to trial by jury. 396 U.S.
at 544; see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976); Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 121; notes 70 & 79
and accompanying text supra. Justice Stewart reasoned that, since the constitution guaran-
tees a jury trial only in suits at common laW, actions brought in equity are not protected.
396 U.S. at 543 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Ross Court noted, however, that the seventh
amendment protects
not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled
proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined,
in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and
equitable remedies were administered . . . .In a just sense, the amendment then
may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty
jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle
legal rights.
396 U.S. at 533 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)) (emphasis in
original). Some fear that Ross will extend the right to jury trial to all legal issues within
equity's concurrent jurisdiction. See J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE RULES PAMPHLET 809-10
(1970); Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 119-21.
11 See 396 U.S. at 538-39; DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th
Cir. 1963). See also Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d
Cir. 1953).
In Ross, the Court distinguished between the overall character of the action and the
underlying issues, refusing to view the action as singularly equitable. See 396 U.S. at 538-39;
Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 116. The Court found that the right to jury trial was
dependent upon the nature of the claim itself and not upon the vehicle enabling the plaintiff
to sue. 396 U.S. at 538 & n.10, 542; Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 305 (6th Cir.
1974). The Court treated the derivative action as having two separate and distinct questions:
the equitable issue of the shareholder's standing to sue derivatively and the legal claims of
the corporation. Beacon and Dairy Queen required that the legal issues be tried to a jury.
See MOORE, supra note 1, 38.11 [8.-8], at 128.18.
1 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. The lower courts generally have accepted and applied the Ross
test to grant and deny jury trials. See, e.g., Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1977);
affl'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1975); Hyde Properties v.
McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1974); Farmers-Peoples Bank v. United States, 477 F.2d
752 (6th Cir. 1973).
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law. 3 In deciding whether there is a right to jury trial, the relief
requested will take on added importance where no clear analogue
is available,94 although the label used to characterize the remedy
cannot be determinative.15 The third Ross factor has received the
most varied interpretation and has been criticized as an unwar-
ranted departure from the traditional aspects of the seventh amend-
ment." Despite the fact that the Ross Court neither relied on the
third criterion as a basis for its holding nor indicated how each
element of its three-pronged test should be weighed,97 "the practical
abilities and limitations of juries" has been interpreted by some
federal courts to serve as a basis for striking jury demands in actions
that were clearly legal in nature.18
Implementation of the Third Criteria of the Ross Test: The Practi-
cal Abilities and Limitations of Juries
In In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation," a complex securi-
ties fraud case,1"' the court observed that, while jury trials clearly
were favored, 1' "the Supreme Court [had] recognized that the use
13 See generally Wolfram, supra note 1, at 643-44. One observer has noted that the Court
failed to specify which "questions" would be examined for their pre-merger customs.
Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 127. It would appear that the Court was referring to the
underlying claim to be tried and not to the vehicle used by the claimant to bring the action.
1, See, e.g., Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 305 (6th Cir. 1974); Ochoa v.
American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 920 (S.D. Tex. 1972). Where both legal and equitable
remedies are available, Beacon and Dairy Queen require the plaintiff to proceed at law. Hyde
Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d at 306; see notes 75-85 and accompanying text supra. See also
Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 127-28.
11 See note 85 and accompanying text supra. Where legal and equitable causes are joined,
Beacon and Dairy Queen require that the right to jury trial be preserved on the legal issues,
even if they are incidental to the equitable issues. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d
1249 (3d Cir. 1969). See notes 88-94 and accompanying text supra.
11 Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 129-30; see In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust
Litigation, 930 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1979). The
practical abilities and limitations of juries have never been considered part of the historical
test, as the division between law and equity was never determined by whether judge or jury
would be a more capable factfinder. See MooRE, supra note 1, 38.11[9], at 128.21; Redish,
Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision
Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 523-25 (1975); Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 130.
11 See Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 129.
,1 See notes 99-112 and accompanying text infra.
11 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
'10 In Boise, the former stockholders of a company which had been acquired sued the
acquiring company for securities fraud. Four cases were consolidated for trial. Id. at 101. The
case involved difficult accounting concepts and required an examination of assets and liabili-
ties of over one billion dollars covering a period of five years. Id. at 103.
101 Id.
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of juries [was] not without limits.' ' 1 2 Reasoning that the third
factor of the Ross test acknowledges that an "impartial and capable
factfinder" is central to the concept of fairness in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments,' 3 the Boise Cascade court struck a de-
mand for a jury trial. It was found that the practical abilities and
limitations of jurors "must be seen as a limitation to or interpreta-
tion of the Seventh Amendment."'0 4 In according constitutional sta-
tus to the capacity of jurors to understand and find the facts, it is
submitted that the Boise Cascade Court misinterpreted the in-
tended function of the tripartite test in Ross. 0 These three factors
apparently were designed only to be used to make a threshold deter-
mination of whether a class of claims was "legal" and therefore
triable by a jury. It is suggested that the Ross court did not intend
jury competence to be an open and overriding question in every
case, but simply one factor in determining the nature of the claim.
In view of the Court's strong policy favoring jury trials, it would
seem unlikely that the Ross Court pronounced a constitutional ex-
ception to the seventh amendment in a footnote, without the benefit
of discussion, direction or explanation. Moreover, the Boise Cascade
court's rationale threatens to erode the seventh amendment by
making jury trials depend upon vague notions of what is beyond the
practical abilities and limitations of jurors.
Other district courts interpreting the third criterion of Ross
have reached similar results, reasoning, however, that complex ac-
tions are within equity jurisdiction and therefore not subject to
'' Id. at 104.
' While conceding that it was not possible to define precisely when a case exceeds the
ability of a jury, the court in Boise suggested that "a number of factors must combine to
convince the Court that a jury would be incapable of fairly deciding the case." Id. The
inability of the jury to act as a capable fact finder in certain situations has been consistently
recognized. See, e.g., Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 57 F.R.D. 23, 24 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd on
other grounds, 528 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1975); THE FEDERALIST, No. 83 (A. Hamilton), at 527-
28 (Lodge ed. 1888); Kirkham, supra note 31, at 208; 1977 Judicial Conference of the Second
Circuit of the United States, Transcript of Proceedings 29 (September 9, 1977) (remarks of
Chief Judge Kaufman). See generally J. FRANK, CouRTS ON TRIAL 108-45 (1949). See also 1
W. HoLnSwoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 347 (6th ed. 1938).
01 420 F. Supp. at 105 (W.D. Wash. 1976); accord, Kirkham, supra note 31, at 209.
Contra, In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 930 ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) A-11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1979); cf. Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 130-33 (third
criterion of the Ross test should not be read into the seventh amendment as a means of
extending jury trial right).
'" See Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 227 (N.D.
Ill. 1977). See also James, The Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALU L.J. 655, 691
(1963).
19791
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:751
seventh amendment protection."'8 For example, in Bernstein v. Uni-
versal Pictures, Inc.,'"° although the application of the first two
criteria of the Ross test suggested that a jury trial was appropriate, 18
the court observed that the third Ross standard was a restatement
of the traditional equity power of the courts to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over matters involving intricate damage calculations or
complex accounts when the remedy at law was inadequate or ineffi-
cient.10
Insofar as Bernstein and other courts"0 relied on the inability
of the jury to understand intricate accounting problems and damage
calculations to justify the invocation of equity jurisdiction, they
were firmly supported by precedent."' These courts, however, did
not restrict their basis for equity jurisdiction to the complex ac-
counting problems involved in those cases. Each court found the
complexity of the case as a whole beyond the competence of the jury
and that, since the remedy at law was inadequate, the entire case
must be heard in equity."' Although an early case suggested that
the power of equity to take jurisdiction might not be limited to
accounts, but may attach if "some difficulty at law should inter-
pose,""' later cases indicate that the complicated nature of the facts
200 Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re U.S. Finan-
cial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977); see ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See also Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301
(6th Cir. 1974). While the result achieved by Bernstein and USF is the same as in Boise
Cascade, the rationales differ. Without disturbing the holding that a complex case is equita-
ble because the remedy at law is inadequate, the Supreme Court could reverse Boise Cascade,
holding that the third Ross criterion was not intended to limit or interpret the seventh
amendment.
107 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
'o' See id. at 66-67.
o Id. at 67-68; see, e.g., Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1889); Kirby v.
Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887); Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling
Co., 26 F.2d 801, 804 (D. Kan. 1928), affl'd, 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931). See generally Dairy
Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D.
702, 713 (S.D. Cal. 1977). See also Bennett v. United Lumber & Supply Co., 110 Conn. 536,
148 A. 369 (1930); Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Cai. Cas. 1, 10-11, 2 N.Y. Common L. Rep. 747, 760-
61 (1805); MOORE, supra note 1, 38.25, at 199.
22 E.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
m See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
2 Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re U.S.
Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 713-14 (S.D. Cal. 1977); note 109 and accompanying
text supra. But cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, Nos. 78-7445, 7448 (2d Cir. June 25, 1979)
(complex case decided by jury).
23 Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 495, 503 (1831). The Fowle Court stated:
In all cases in which an action of account would be the proper remedy at law,. ... ..
the jurisdiction of a court of equity is undoubted . . . .But in transactions not of
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in an action where no accounts or accountings are involved, would
not be a sufficient basis for equity jurisdiction."4
While extending the concept of an inadequate remedy at law
to instances where the jury cannot understand the evidence is ap-
pealing because it allows the court to invoke equity jurisdiction, it
is submitted that such an extension is subject to the same criticism
as the Boise Cascade rationale. Great discretion would lie in the
hands of a trial judge to deny a jury based on the judge's conception
of the practical abilities and limitations of the jurors and the com-
plexity of the case, a result most likely not intended by the framers
of the seventh amendment."5 Moreover, this rationale appears to be
inconsistent with Beacon, wherein the Supreme Court restricted the
discretion of the trial courts to control their own dockets, so that the
right to jury trial could be most effectively preserved."'
BEYOND Ross
Consistent with preserving the right to jury trial where complex
cases are not involved, it is suggested that jury trial should be elimi-
nated in areas where complex suits most frequently arise. The Su-
preme Court has stated that in matters involving public rights,"'
this peculiar character, great complexity ought to exist in the accounts, or some
difficulty at law should interpose, . . . in order to induce a court of chancery to
exercise jurisdiction.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
"I Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633, 636 (1914); United States v. Bitter Root Dev.
Co., 200 U.S. 451, 475 (1906); Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76
F.R.D. 224, 228 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801,
804 (D. Kan. 1928), affl'd, 46 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1931); accord, Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78
F.R.D. 218, 226 n.13 (D.R.I. 1978); see Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971). But cf. Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 921 (S.D.
Tex. 1972) (apart from damage issue, an entire case may be so complex as to render remedy
at law inadequate).
15 See Wolfram, supra note 1, at 644; Uncertain Future, supra note 34, at 129-30.
I See 359 U.S. at 510; 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
", A public right exists in "cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity
to enforce public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact .... "
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450
(1977). An order of a governmental agency is said to enforce a public right even though the
benefit accrues to an individual. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
90 (1965). Thus, the amended statutes properly could provide for damages for injured parties.
Inasmuch as the proceeding is both initiated and controlled by the agency, the statutory right
to enforcement belongs to the public rather than to an individual. Id., see Amalgamated Util.
Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 269 (1940). In determining the limits to
the concept of a public right, Proffessor Jaffe notes that "[t]he classification must no doubt
rest on a specifically defined statutory policy, the enforcement of which is committed to
public authorities." JAFFE, supra, at 90. Where solely private rights are at stake, the use of
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Congress may commit the trial of all issues to an administrative
agency." 8 In the antitrust and securities fields, where government
regulation already is extensive, it is submitted that Congress pro-
perly could assign the adjudication of all claims arising under those
statutes to an administrative agency, as it has done in the field of
labor relations."9 In doing so, neither amorphous limitations to the
seventh amendment nor discretionary enlargements of equity juris-
diction would be created.
The concept of administrative enforcement of the antitrust and
securities laws is appealing. Through its expertise, the agency would
function in a manner similar to a "blue ribbon" jury,20 and since
the agency would be required to document its findings of fact and
an administrative agency as factfinder has been sanctioned in limited instances as an
"adjunct to an Art. mI court." Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 n.7 (1977); see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
"' See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442 (1977); MooRE, supra note 1, 38.1119], at 128.20. In Atlas, the petitioners challenged
the constitutionality of the enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act without
a jury trial and a finding by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission that
they had violated the Act. The petitioners argued that since the Commission's suit to collect
the civil penalties was tantamount to an action at law for a money judgment, a jury trial was
required. 430 U.S. at 449. The Court held, however, that, since public rights were involved,
Congress could assign the adjudication of the claims to an administrative agency without
violating the seventh amendment. Id. at 455; see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932). See also Lloyd Sabaudo
Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335 (1932); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improve-
ment Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856). Moreover, this principle pertains even where a
jury trial would have been required by the seventh amendment had Congress chosen courts
of law to adjudicate the causes of action. 430 U.S. at 455. See also Pernell v. Southall Realty,
416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974).
"I See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In Jones & Laughlin,
the Court concluded that the adjudication of unfair labor practices under the National Labor
Relations Act by the National Labor Relations Board was not violative of the seventh amend-
ment, notwithstanding that reinstatement and backpay could be ordered. Such a proceeding
could not be classified as a "suit at common law." Id. at 48. Rather, the action was a
"statutory proceeding," not requiring a jury trial. Id. In cases subsequent to Jones &
Laughlin, the Supreme Court has determined that the seventh amendment does not restrict
the power of Congress to create administrative agencies with the ability to enforce statutory
rights. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974); see Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S.
363, 383 (1974); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
120 A "blue ribbon" jury is a jury selected from a panel of key members of the community,
generally when there is an important case. While this practice is employed in some states, it
is prohibited in the federal courts by the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1861-1869, (1976), as amended by Jury System Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
572, 92 Stat. 2453, which mandates random selection of jurors. 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1976); see
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973); United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975); S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A
POLITICAL SYSTEM 92 (2d ed. 1976); G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 109 (rev. ed. 1974).
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conclusions of law, it is likely to be less arbitrary than a jury.'1'
Moreover, an agency's findings of fact could be more readily chal-
lenged than a jury's, thus adding an element of protection.' 22
Of course, this proposal is not without drawbacks. It is overin-
clusive because the protection of the jury will be sacrificed in anti-
trust and securities cases which are not complex. This result, how-
ever, is preferable to conditioning seventh amendment rights on a
discretionary assessment of the "practical abilities and limitations"
of jurors. With no guidelines as to what that means, one can only
assume that a standard of "You'll know it when you see it," will be
applied. The seventh amendment should not be subject to such
unfettered discretion. Although this proposal will reach most large,
complex cases, it is also underinclusive in that it fails to provide for
complex cases which may occur in other areas of law.'2 Perhaps
masters and special verdicts can assist the courts in those cases,
especially if the cases are not as unwieldy, and concepts and termi-
nology are familiar to the jurors. Finally, it undoubtedly will be
costly to create a new agency, and such considerations cannot be
dismissed lightly, but a capable and efficient factfinder would be
assured, the seventh amendment would not be open to erosion, and
congestion and costs in the courts would be reduced.
121 The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976) provides that
each decision reached in an administrative agency proceeding must include a documentation
of "findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefore, on all the material issues of
fact, law, or discretion presented on the record." It has been noted that in most federal cases
involving jury trials, a general verdict is used, requiring only that the jury find for one of the
parties. C. WRiGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 94, at 417 (2d ed. 1970).
112 The standard generally adopted by administrative agencies to allow judicial review
on determinations of questions of fact is one of substantial evidence. Many statutory schemes
expressly provide for such. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(f) (1976), where it is stated that "[tihe determinations of the Secretary shall be
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." The
courts have provided this interpretation in cases where a statute was silent as to the standard
for judicial review. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Ellers v.
Railroad Retirement Bd., 132 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1943). Chief Justice Hughes, in
Consolidated Edison, gave, perhaps, the most widely accepted definition of substantial evi-
dence. He concluded that "[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion." 305 U.S. at 229 (citations omitted). The seventh amendment, of course, prohibits the
re-examination of a jury's findings of fact. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. While a jury verdict may
be challenged, a fact tried by a jury may not. Id. The substantial evidence rule, therefore,
affords the litigant in an administrative proceeding this additional benefit.
121 See note 3 supra.
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CONCLUSION
Although the jury has improved the quality of justice in this
country and has protected litigants from arbitrariness and bias, its
use in complex litigation has given rise to serious problems for ju-
rors, courts and litigants. In some cases, masters may assist the jury
in its role as factfinder, and the use of special verdicts may insulate
litigants from clearly erroneous general verdicts, but these devices
are piecemeal measures which do not adequately address the myr-
iad of problems associated with complex antitrust and securities
litigation.
It has been suggested that jury trials should be sacrificed in
complex antitrust or securities cases. This end, however, should not
be achieved by opening the seventh amendment to erosion in other
areas. Consequently, rationales which engraft discretionary limita-
tions onto the seventh amendment or enlarge equity jurisdiction
should be discouraged as both are subject to potential abuse by
judges who overestimate the complexity of a case or underestimate
the capabilities of the jury. Instead, Congress should provide for an
alternate factfinder by amending the antitrust and securities laws
to require trial by an administrative agency. While this proposal
would not solve all the problems associated with complex litigation,
it is preferable to an ineffective factfinder or having seventh amend-
ment rights dependent on a court's notion of what is beyond a jury's
competence.
Maralynne Flehner
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